Tenant boundaries
Isolation is required across identity, API, storage, queues, search, evidence and customer-side components. Cross-tenant data exposure is a release blocker.
Yerokom is being built as privileged enterprise infrastructure. Security claims therefore need implementation, release scope, adversarial testing and verifiable evidence—not a badge generated from a design document.
Security requirements span the control plane, customer-side components, connectors, release artifacts, identity, storage, queues, search, evidence and support operations. A failure in one layer cannot be treated as an isolated application bug.
Isolation is required across identity, API, storage, queues, search, evidence and customer-side components. Cross-tenant data exposure is a release blocker.
Use scoped identity, federation and short-lived credentials where possible. Privileges should be target- and purpose-bound rather than broadly reusable.
Credentials and sensitive tokens should not appear in ordinary UI, API responses, logs, exports or customer-facing documents.
Release requirements include review, dependency and artifact scanning, SBOM/provenance, signing, staged delivery and rejection of untrusted updates.
Customers need practical read-only, revoke and stop controls that do not depend on reaching support during a critical event.
Backups are not treated as recovery evidence until restoration is tested. Existing customer operations should remain independently usable during a Yerokom outage.
Supported management actions are designed to carry scope, policy, authorization, execution evidence, after-state verification and recovery intent together.
Resolve the exact targets and desired state, evaluate prerequisites and policy, establish authorization and record what is expected to change.
Use the supported management path with bounded credentials and scope. Preserve output and failures without converting discovery capability into general-purpose write access.
Collect resulting state through an appropriate verification path, compare it to the intended outcome, and retain recovery evidence when the result is incomplete or wrong.
Inventory, telemetry, configuration, identities, execution output and support artifacts have different sensitivity. Release-specific data flows should identify purpose, location, access and retention rather than hiding everything under a generic “telemetry” label.
The trust center separates engineering intent and internal evidence from external certifications or assessments. Independent claims should become public only after the relevant external work is actually complete.
Evaluation scope should identify data flows, integrations, management permissions and release-specific controls before access expands beyond read-only discovery.
The public site enforces HTTPS and canonical URLs. Enquiries are validated server-side, protected against forged requests and written to a private company inbox before receipt. Price inputs are recalculated at intake; browser totals are not accepted as an offer.
These are website controls. They do not establish the security, integration coverage or customer readiness of a product release.
Review the procurement packet